This blog is part of our Emerging Perspectives series, showcasing original research and fresh analyses by current and former students of Near East University on regional politics, governance, and international affairs.

On 10 May 2025, I took part in the first-ever Model United Nations (MUN) conference organised at Near East University by the Near East Institute. During the conference, I represented North Korea in a session on the use of force of nuclear states against non-nuclear states, prepared a position paper outlining my country’s stance and proposed a mechanism for achieving nuclear disarmament. As we have recently seen from Iran’s decision to withdraw from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine, this issue remains as urgent and as complex as ever.

Peace through law: The post-war legal framework

Since the end of the Second World War, the international legal order has sought to restrain the unilateral use of force among states. The existing legal framework regulating the use of force in international law is enshrined in the UN Charter. The UN Charter provides that the prohibition on the use of force is not absolute and that force may be used against another state when such an act is authorized by the UN Security Council as part of collective security mechanism and a state is acting in self-defense (Article 51). But there still exists a structural imbalance, as nuclear powers enjoy overwhelming strategic leverage in terms of deterrence over non-nuclear states. It was precisely on this premise that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was established in 1970 to substitute nuclear deterrence with legal restraint by embedding asymmetry within a rules-based framework. In return for renouncing nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states were promised security through international law, institutional oversight, and the responsible conduct of nuclear-armed powers. While the NPT has achieved significant success in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, the overall effectiveness of international law, especially in terms of protecting non-nuclear states, remains contested.

Iran

On 12 June 2025, the IAEA adopted a resolution accusing Iran of non-compliance with the obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which Tahran had signed back in 1968. In the days that followed, a 12‑day conflict in June between Iran and Israel/US forces heightened regional tensions. Amid this context, Iran’s parliament passed a bill on 25 June 2025 that effectively suspended cooperation with the IAEA. On 2 July 2025, Masoud Pezeshkian signed the legislation into law, formally putting into effect the suspension of cooperation and stipulating that future inspections must obtain approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Iranian officials justified the suspension as a response to the bias within the IAEA, and as a measure to safeguard national security, sovereignty and the country’s nuclear facilities and scientists.

While Iran remains a member of the NPT, this move has complicated the application of obligations and raised questions about the balance between treaty commitments and sovereign rights in the face of external military threats and aggression from nuclear states that the existing legal framework was not able to stop.

Ukraine

A similar trajectory can be observed in Ukraine. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. In 1994, it agreed to relinquish these weapons and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK under the Budapest Memorandum.

However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion in 2022 exposed the weakness of such political assurances and the lack of binding enforceable mechanisms. Although there were strong international condemnations and economic sanctions, the Budapest Memorandum failed to prevent or reverse aggression by Russia. Ukraine’s ongoing experience of Russian aggression reflects a central dilemma in the international legal order: while non-nuclear states are encouraged to disarm and trust in collective security, the lack of a credible enforcement doesn’t give them enough actions to maintain peace, it becomes paper talk.

The gap between legal norms and political reality

Both Iran and Ukraine illustrate the gap between the legal framework managing the use of force and the realities of state behavior. Beyond Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter, other instruments of international law and compliance mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and customary international law, aim to ensure accountability; however, their effectiveness remains limited when enforcement depends on the consent or cooperation of powerful states. The same reality applies to the NPT and the protection of non-nuclear states, despite widespread adherence to the NPT, enforcement for protecting non-nuclear states remains limited. The NPT framework relies heavily on voluntary compliance, and its enforcement mechanism have proven ineffective when great powers are involved, while the other frameworks lack consistent enforcement capacity. The ICJ 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons further highlighted this ambiguity: while the court reaffirmed the general illegality of force and emphasized the restrictions under the humanitarian law, it could not clearly rule out the use of nuclear weapons in extreme self-defense.

What ultimately emerges then, is a legal order that sets clear normative boundaries on the use of force and the possession of nuclear weapons, yet offers only limited enforceable protection to non-nuclear states. The prohibition of aggression in the UN Charter and the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT reflect a global commitment to collective security. However, as the experiences of states show, these legal norms often fail to protect states from coercion or conflict when facing the realities of strategic power. So, the enduring challenge is whether international law can evolve to deliver genuine and consistent protection for non-nuclear states, or whether power politics will continue to systematically override legal principles when doing so aligns with the interests of those who yield the most power.