As debates over energy connectivity and regional cooperation around Cyprus resurface, it is worth revisiting how the island fits into broader US foreign policy thinking. This is particularly relevant given that the most recent US National Security Strategy, published in December, makes no tangible reference to the Eastern Mediterranean as a distinct strategic theatre — a silence that underscores the region’s instrumental rather than central place in Washington’s strategic lexicon. This absence suggests that Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean are viewed through the lens of broader priorities like energy routes, alliance management, and competing great-power agendas rather than as standalone strategic objectives.

US Engagement Beyond the White House

While President Trump’s foreign policy has tended to focus on headline-grabbing issues elsewhere, US engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean has been sustained — and in some respects deepened — through Congressional initiatives that reflect bipartisan interest. Legislative efforts such as the repeated reauthorisation of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act and the Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act indicate congressional intent to shape energy cooperation and security frameworks involving countries like Cyprus, Israel and Greece. While this institutional activism is important in signalling continuity and backing for Eastern Mediterranean engagement even when executive-level rhetoric appears distracted or ambivalent, it is far from immune to tendencies in presidential foreign policy making that are quietly becoming the norm.

To be more precise, US interest in Eastern Mediterranean energy reflects a transactional streak that has become familiar under Trump (what we may call "disruptive realism, but more on that in a different blog): engagement driven less by long-term regional stewardship than by immediate utility. And it has concrete limits. When projects cease to align with US interests, support can be abruptly withdrawn. Washington’s withdrawal of backing from the EastMed gas pipeline project, accompanied by statements from senior US officials questioning its feasibility, is a clear example of how US support can be conditional and reversible when interests shift.

Cyprus’ Energy Ambitions and Alliance Shelter

So, where does Cyprus fit in all this? Cyprus’ own energy ambitions under Greek Cypriot leadership are best understood through the lens of "alliance shelter" — the same logic that underpinned its accession to the European Union. In this sense, energy has been viewed not merely as an economic asset, but as a political tool through which the Greek Cypriot leadership of the de-facto partitioned island could embed itself within wider regional and transatlantic security frameworks. Of course, this strategy has been emboldened by regional developments, including periods of strain in Türkiye’s regional relations and fluctuating dynamics with major powers, above all the US. Making the most of this opportunity, Cyprus has sought shelter by embedding itself into emerging regional complexes — deepening partnerships with Israel, Greece, Egypt, and France — advancing a narrative of itself as an “emerging power”, all the while being buttressed by broader support from Washington.

More recently, Cyprus has expanded its diplomatic reach beyond traditional partners. In December 2025, the first official visit by a UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to Cyprus marked a historic milestone in bilateral relations, reaffirming a broad strategic partnership across trade, investment, energy cooperation, but also defence infrastructure.

Another significant development in 2025 was the signing of a long-awaited maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon in November, ending nearly two decades of impasse. The accord, which delineates the Exclusive Economic Zone between the two countries, is framed as a shift in regional energy politics that could benefit further Cyprus’ energy diplomacy and economic strategy.

In addition, Cyprus and France signed a new Strategic Declaration in December 2025, enhancing cooperation in defence, economy, and European coordination at a time when Nicosia prepares to assume the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The defence component of this partnership reflects a maturing bilateral relationship that goes beyond symbolic ties to more structured and operational cooperation — again framed by Nicosia as an important factor in Cyprus’ wider security strategy.

The Türkiye Variable and a Shifting Equilibrium

The equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, remains fragile. Recent signs of US-Türkiye rapprochement could alter the strategic balance. Under Trump's presidency in particular, engagement with Ankara is already being shaped by a highly transactional logic influenced by personal diplomacy and Trump's business instincts as much as traditional geopolitical calculation. And while some have suggested it as a panacea for the decades old Cyprus problem, this approach may complicate frozen conflict settings like Cyprus, where abrupt shifts in external alignments can have outsized effects. Türkiye's growing regional weight meanwhile — manifest in its roles in Ukraine, Syria, and broader Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean affairs — requires robust, sustained engagement rather than transactional attention if the Cyprus question is to be addressed meaningfully.

Energy, Limits, and a Narrowing Window

So, for the US, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean will continue to matter — but unevenly and instrumentally. Washington’s engagement is likely to remain shaped by broader regional calculations: energy diversification, alliance management, and the need to balance relations with Türkiye against cooperation with smaller partners. This means that US policy toward Cyprus will remain supportive at the margins, but rarely decisive, and always conditional on shifting strategic priorities beyond the island itself. And while Trump may yet turn his attention to the Eastern Mediterranean, the "disruptive realism" that has defined his foreign policy — transactional, personalised, and unpredictable — may not produce outcomes that are viable or beneficial for the long-term interests of the regional actors, including the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus.

For the latter, the recent developments over connectivity indicate that energy still offers some opportunities — even after years of under-utilisation and despite a narrowing window created by the global energy transition. But these opportunities cannot be realised despite the ongoing conflict, or through the current Greek Cypriot pursuit of "alliance shelter" alone. What is required instead is a strategy that recognises Türkiye's growing regional influence and the limits of conditional external backing — one that prioritises sustained engagement to resolve the Cyprus problem itself.

In this context, the recent political developments in Cyprus, and specifically the election of the moderate Tufan Erhürman as the new Turkish Cypriot leader, may represent one of the most promising openings in years — if it is recognised and acted upon. Without progress on the political question, energy will remain a fragile instrument: symbolically powerful, but strategically insufficient.