The escalation in Yemen has taken a dangerous turn, reshaped the map of territorial control, and introduced a new dimension to regional instability. September proved to be a pivotal month in the ground fighting between forces of the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRGY) and the Houthis, with the latter consolidating control over much of the country’s western coastline. Their advances, including the capture of Mocha and strategically significant islands in the Red Sea, demonstrate the Houthis’ growing operational capacity and their ability to project power across the critical maritime corridor, Bab al-Mandab.

At the same time, attacks against critical infrastructures in Saudi Arabia have resumed, in coordination with partners within the broader “Axis of Resistance.” The recent drone strike targeting the East-West Pipeline underscores the Houthis’ continued ability not only to clog but also to sever the oil arteries.

How did the conflict reach this point, and how might the situation unfold? More importantly, what regional repercussions could result from the Houthis’ expanding territorial control in the Red Sea?

A Spark in a Powder Keg

For more than a decade, the Houthis steadily expanded their military capabilities and emerged as a significant threat to Saudi Arabia’s security. They were not viewed as a sustained threat to international maritime, but instead as a southern front in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia and the Houthis agreed to a truce in April 2022 for two months and was renewed multiple times. Although the truce was later allowed to lapse formally, it remained effectively in place since it served the interests of both sides where the Houthis sought to use the negotiations to secure political and economic concessions, and Saudi Arabia aimed to shield its territory from Houthi attacks and exit the war and play diplomacy. The ceasefire proved successful in reducing tensions and bringing an end to a period of reciprocal strikes that had persisted since the Houthis took over Sana’a and the Saudi-led coalition launched its military intervention in 2015 to restore the IRGY.

In 2023, amid the Israeli war on Gaza, the Houthis used the Bab al-Mandab Strait as leverage, disrupting global trade and forcing rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope. However, their operations began to decline noticeably in early 2025, as they also reached an agreement with the U.S., to exclude American ships from their attacks. Yet, they continued targeting Israel-linked ships after announcing “Phase Four” in mid-2025. Nevertheless, attacks halted by October due to the “ceasefire” in Gaza; consequently, shipping companies began reconsidering slow return to the Red Sea route.

Then in early 2026, the world was once again rattled by Iran’s swift blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.–Israeli war against the former.  Given that more than a fifth of total world oil imports and 80% of it is designated for the Asian market exit from Hormuz, which Saudi Arabia has the highest share in, the blockade has forced it to reroute, exporting through Bab al-Mandab from the East-West pipeline to Yanbu Port, which witnessed a fivefold increase compared to last year.

There was no obstruction from Houthis on these ships, as the unofficial ceasefire was ongoing and there was no strategic reason to escalate, as the Houthis wanted to trade this “goodwill” gesture for compromises. However, the possibility of a choke on both Straits is worrying for global markets, amid an oil supply deficit and rising oil prices. The Sana’a Airport strikes in July this year has activated the long-feared Houthis option, and marked an end to a ceasefire that lasted for over four years. The blockade so far targeting Saudi ships, nevertheless further escalation might elevate. Now Saudi Arabia is forced to divert to the Cape of Good Hope through the SUMED/Suez Canal, which is an insufficient solution.

More Complicated than Ever

The region is living a moment of new disorder, and instability is the general description of the condition, as threat perceptions are rearranged and new alliances are forming. A clear indication of Israel’s extension of influence, destabilization, and to an extent, Israeli hegemonic project exists too, which is regionally rejected. How will Saudi Arabia address the current crisis within the wider regional context?

The Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have realized the limitations of U.S. bases and the Abraham Accords in light of the Iranian attacks on their soil, but rather a burden to be re-evaluated, prompting a search for alternatives. While Riyadh has avoided direct involvement in the current war and has been navigating regional order-building, the Houthis' escalation has provided grounds to accelerate the arrangements. A Saudi-led maritime defence coalition was formed ten days after the blockade, bringing together 14 countries. Despite the possibility of coalition’s further expansion, questions remain over its political alignment and operational capacity in the long-term. Notably, the coalition does not include the UAE or Oman. Riyadh’s widening rift with Abu Dhabi may further prove difficult to repair, particularly after the UAE backed the Southern Transitional Council secessionist maneuver in southern Yemen late last year. Oman, meanwhile, has long maintained a policy of neutrality and is currently engaged in talks with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. The coalition, however, include Pakistan and Türkiye, both of which, along with Saudi Arabia, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, which specifies “that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.”

Although cooperation for deterrence is developing on one side, the other side yields more potential for gradual escalation. The Houthis have positioned themselves as an emerging faction within the “Axis of Resistance” due to the strategic weight of their maritime operations. The Axis actors have shown deepening cooperation despite their core ideological differences, relying on common interests through political tendencies in opposing Western involvement and policies in the Middle East. They exhibit varying degrees of intellectual reference and theological beliefs, ranging from relatively broad, such as those between Hamas and Iran, to narrower ones, such as between Hezbollah and Iran. Meanwhile, similarly, ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab (affiliated with al-Qaeda) have reportedly developed over the past few years, from arms sales, including drones, to reaching an operational maritime phase in the last incidents, alerting to further destabilization in the Red Sea.

A Test Ahead

Many observers believe the Houthis represent Saudi Arabia's first test. While this may be the case, it will not be the decisive factor in determining the defencive pact’s course or success. While expectations do not include a comprehensive intervention in the near future in response to direct Houthi attacks on Saudi land, the maritime coalition, coupled with it vested security and economic interests, is likely to encourage a greater degree of active participation in efforts to disrupt and contain Houthi maritime activity.

Considering the implications Bab al-Mandab crisis beyond the region, the EU consider also expanding Operation Aspides, which could also benefit from coordination and cooperation with regional efforts, and vice versa. Such complementarity could help consolidate a more coherent maritime security and collective capacity to deter and respond to threats in the Red Sea. At the very least, the evolving ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab will warrant further scrutiny, as deeper cooperation between the two groups could potentially increase the scale and sophistication of attacks, thereby increasing the complication at Bab al-Mandab.