Amid the ongoing war, on October 9th, the two rival Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah resumed their discussions in Cairo, focusing primarily on halting Israeli aggression in Gaza and post-war arrangements for governance and border management. Two main options were considered: a technocratic government and a committee-based governance system. While Hamas did not oppose either proposal, it expressed a preference for the technocratic approach. The more likely outcome appears to be the formation of a committee to govern the Gaza Strip; however, details regarding the mechanism and structure remain unspecified. Overall, the discussions appear to be heading in the right direction, building on the unity process initiated in the Moscow and Beijing rounds.

Following Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, after 38 years of occupation, Palestinian factions agreed to hold free and fair legislative elections in January 2006. Unexpectedly, Hamas decided to run for the elections, having previously opposed them in 1996. The surprises continued when the Islamist group secured a majority, enabling it to form a government on its own, despite initial attempts to create a unity government with Fatah, which the latter rejected. A year later, a brief unity government was formed under the Mecca agreement, but it quickly collapsed. Tensions escalated between the two factions, leading to violent confrontations in the streets of Gaza. Fatah was ultimately defeated and expelled from Gaza, and since then, Hamas has maintained control over the Strip.

Fatah — the largest faction within the Palestinian Authority (PA) — and Hamas, have had an uneasy relationship even before the war in Gaza, largely due to their differing ideological compass and approaches to the Palestinian question. Hamas is an Islamist organisation, while Fatah is secular nationalist. For decades, Fatah engaged in armed resistance against Israeli occupation. However, this changed when Yasser Arafat, the President of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), signed the Oslo Accords in 1993 and Oslo II in 1995. These agreements paved the way for the founding of the PA and marked a shift from armed resistance to peaceful negotiation. While the accords did not lead to the recognition of a Palestinian state, they did affirm the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in exchange for recognising the Israeli state. In contrast, Hamas opposes the recognition of Israel and maintains its claim over historic Palestine. Following Hamas's electoral victory, tensions escalated, leading to violent confrontations and further complicating the already fraught relationship between the two factions.

From the outset of the current war, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has faced immense pressure from the Israeli government, Palestinian factions, and the public. Mahmoud Abbas, the PA President, has offered a mix of responses since October 7th, that have been described as conflictual. In an emergency meeting in Ramallah on the same day as Hamas’s operation, he stated that Palestinians have the right to self-defence against settlers’ terrorism and occupation forces. Abbas has been unwavering in his insistence that recognising a Palestinian state is the key to ending the conflict and promoting stability in the region. As one of the main architects of the Oslo Accords, he remains committed to upholding its agreements and advocating for non-violent resistance. However, his comments regarding the right to self-defence brough about a backlash from the Israeli government and increased pressure on the PA. On October 16, 2023, the Palestinian News and Information Agency (WAFA) published a statement from Abbas after a phone call with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, asserting that “Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people.” The statement was later deleted from the website following public outrage. The PA finds itself between a rock and a hard place where both silence and action carry significant risks. The unpopularity of Abbas, who has been President for 19 years, has made the PA cautious in its remarks about Hamas. Indeed, its reaction to Hamas’s operation has been limited to stating that Hamas’s attack has given an excuse to Israel to attack Gaza and commit atrocities against the Palestinian people. Overall, the PA has struggled to navigate its stance, balancing the need to justify or renounce the actions of both Hamas and the Israeli government.

Prospects for reconciliation

Despite a series of previous attempts to reconcile and establish agreements between Hamas and Fatah, all efforts have ultimately failed. During the current war, Hamas expressed interest in forming a national unity government that would encompass Palestinian political factions from both Gaza and the West Bank. In February 2024, representatives from both factions convened in Moscow to discuss potential reconciliation following the resignation of Prime Minister Shtayyeh's government. Shtayyeh clarified that his resignation was driven by the pressing political, security, and economic challenges resulting from the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians. He emphasised the need for new governmental and political arrangements, underscoring the importance of national unity discussions, internal consensus, and the expansion of the PA's sovereignty over Palestinian territories. After the meeting, Mustafa Barghouti, Secretary-General of the Palestinian National Initiative, expressed optimism, noting that he had never seen a more united atmosphere, as people began to take responsibility for the numerous tragedies endured by the Palestinian people. The discussions focused on key issues of unifying the Palestinian factions under the PLO umbrella, stopping the war on Gaza, forming the next government, and ensuring the continuation of talks. While Hamas agreed to join the PLO, details regarding the implementation and mechanisms were left for future meetings. Although Hamas has advocated for a national unity government that includes all Palestinian political components, it has ultimately agreed to a technocratic government.

With the promise of progress on the horizon, the meeting represented a crucial step toward national reconciliation and consensus. While it may have appeared procedural, it successfully advanced discussions between the conflicting factions, helping to bridge gaps despite ongoing obstacles.  Two weeks after the meeting, Abbas appointed Mohammed Mustafa, his senior economic adviser and a close associate, to form a new government. The appointment, however, marked another setback in efforts to resolve the 17-year-old dispute. Accusations were exchanged between the Authority and Hamas, with each side blaming the other for being out of touch with reality. Hamas, along with the Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian National Initiative, issued a statement rejecting President Abbas's decision to assign Mustafa for the job. Despite these factions' preference for an inclusive national unity government, they claimed that their objection stemmed from their exclusion from the decision-making process, emphasising that forming a government without national consensus reinforces a policy of individualism. In response, Assam al-Ahmad, a member of the Fatah movement's Revolutionary Council and the PLO's Executive Committee, asserted that President Abbas has the authority to establish a government according to the nation's basic law approved by the Legislative Council. He also pointed out that Hamas did not consult others when it launched Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7.

In July, there was another round of conciliation efforts with representatives from Fatah, Hamas, and twelve other Palestinian factions gathering in China to sign the Beijing Declaration.  Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, concluded that the core outcome of the agreement was the affirmation of the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with goals of achieving a sustainable and lasting ceasefire, discussing governance and reconstruction in Gaza post-war, and securing full UN membership for the Palestinian state.

While the parties have previously struck similar agreements, these all fell short of non-implementation. This time however, there are strong reasons which indicate that the prospect of a possible unity agreement appears closer than ever.

Firstly, both parties appear to be more pragmatic. The Palestinian Authority lacks internal legitimacy as neither presidential nor legislative elections have been held for nearly two decades. Although elections were scheduled for 2021, they have been postponed indefinitely. Besides, it’s popularity is declining: a June opinion poll indicated that satisfaction with the Authority and President Abbas declined to 80%. Furthermore, the growing pressure and continuous bullying from the Netanyahu government on the PA have made it reconsider its calculations on the urgent need for national unity. Even the West Bank, which is under PA control, has not been spared from intensive Israeli raids. Over the past year, 749 Palestinians have been assassinated, 6,200 have been wounded, and more than 11,000 people have been arrested. Based on a three-decade-old agreement, Israel collects and transfers the tax revenue for the PA. But Israeli control over the Palestinian finances has been used severally in blackmailing the Authority amid legal and political manoeuvres. For example, it froze the tax revenues in 2015 when the Authority sought to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) to pursue criminal charges against Israel. So far, Israel has withheld over 600 million dollars and deducted half a billion dollars from tax revenues.  For its part, Hamas understands its status and limitations regarding its institutional role. Labelled a terrorist organisation by numerous countries, it lacks the legal status to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. In addition, national unity is almost inevitable for post-war reconstruction and governance. Hamas will either be totally barred or will not be able to effectively govern the Gaza Strip and the only way out is through a compromise.

The second factor is the convergence of opinions compared to previous years. In contrast to the 1988 Hamas Covenant, its 2017 Charter accepts the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders while refusing to recognise Israel. Since then, establishing a Palestinian state has become a priority for the Islamist group. Throughout the war, Hamas's political bureau has urged the Palestinian Authority (PA) to seize the momentum, both regionally and globally, in advocating for a Palestinian state, without the obligation to recognise Israel. Moreover, talks have reflected Hamas’s acceptance of joining the PLO so long as this would not affect its position regarding the recognition of the Israeli state or the principles of the Oslo Accords. At the same time, the PA appears to be aware of unavoidable compromise with other factions, and any further revitalisation without consensus would mostly worsen its condition.

As there are elements that boost the chances of finalising and implementing national unity, hindering causes also exist. The U.S. will most likely use its influence to prevent any possibility of reconciliation and impose its own agenda on the Palestinian parties. A renewed cycle of finger-pointing is also a risk that could jeopardise efforts.  Given the demands for concessions from the Palestinian factions, if the cycle of accusations and disruption continues, the process may mirror the failures of previous attempts at unity.

In sum, the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority remains fraught with tension, yet the urgent circumstances surrounding them demand reconciliation. The current war is seen in existential terms, and the domestic challenges both factions face further compel them to find common ground. To achieve national unity, ongoing dialogue, bridging ideological divides, and making necessary concessions are vital. While the obstacles to successful negotiations may seem daunting, this is a critical moment in Palestine's history. And perhaps more than ever, the hopes of the Palestinian people are pinned on these factions confronting their challenges head-on and demonstrating a genuine commitment to overcoming them.