I recently had the opportunity to attend the 18th Istanbul Security Conference, organised by our good colleagues at Başkent University’s Centre Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Turkey office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Over the years, the conference has established itself as one of the region’s important platforms for dialogue on international security, bringing together academics, policymakers, diplomats, and experts to exchange views on emerging geopolitical and strategic challenges.

Beyond the formal sessions, one of the more valuable aspects of the conference was the chance to participate in one of the working groups, where discussions moved beyond official talking points and into broader strategic debates surrounding Türkiye’s increasingly complex security environment.

A recurring theme throughout the panel was that Türkiye no longer faces isolated crises, but rather an interconnected and overlapping security landscape stretching from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. The discussions reflected not only on current conflicts, but also on the deeper structural transformations shaping the regional and international order.

Russia, Ukraine and the Fragility of the West

One of the more striking themes emerging from the discussions on Russia and the war in Ukraine was that the real vulnerabilities facing Moscow may ultimately prove to be political rather than purely military. The conversation repeatedly returned to the growing tensions within the Russian system itself, particularly the extent to which elite competition, institutional fragmentation and internal power struggles could become more consequential than developments on the battlefield. In this sense, Russia was described less as a coherent strategic actor and more as a system increasingly shaped by competing networks of influence. Several discussions also highlighted how the Russian elite today appears less capable of independently shaping policy, functioning instead within a far more rigid and centralised political structure.

At the same time, there was also caution against underestimating Russia’s resilience. Despite clear strains associated with mobilisation, sanctions and battlefield attrition, there was little sense that the Russian war effort is approaching imminent collapse. If anything, the discussions reflected growing concern that Western assumptions regarding Russia’s exhaustion may themselves become strategically dangerous.

Equally striking was the degree to which attention shifted from Moscow to the West itself. Rather than focusing solely on Russia’s weaknesses, many conversations centred on the political fragility emerging within Europe and the wider transatlantic alliance. Declining public support for continued assistance to Ukraine, rising political polarisation across NATO countries, and growing transactionalism within Western politics were all seen as developments that could gradually reshape the strategic balance in Moscow’s favour.

At the same time, there was a strong sense that a settlement imposed on Ukraine under Russian terms could generate what some participants described as the “perils of peace”: not stability, but rather the normalisation of revisionism and coercive geopolitics. The wider concern, therefore, was not simply the outcome of the war itself, but the future durability of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Perhaps most revealing was how discussions about Ukraine increasingly evolved into broader questions about the future of the West. By 2030, participants envisioned scenarios ranging from a more cohesive NATO anchored by sustained US commitment, to a far more fragmented international order characterised by strategic ambiguity, weakened alliances and increasingly transactional interstate relations. In many ways, the debate reflected a deeper anxiety that the war in Ukraine may ultimately be exposing not only the limits of Russian power, but also the growing fragility of Western cohesion itself.

The Middle East and the Crisis of Regional Order

If the discussions on Ukraine reflected concerns about the fragility of the West, the Middle East conversations revealed a deeper sense of crisis surrounding the regional order itself. A recurring argument throughout the conference was that repeated attempts to externally reshape political orders in the region have often produced fragmentation rather than stability. From Iraq and Libya to Syria and Sudan, participants repeatedly pointed to the weakening of state structures, the proliferation of non-state actors, and the emergence of prolonged governance vacuums.

Iran occupied a particularly central place within these debates. Rather than appearing weakened, Tehran was often described as a political system that has become more internally consolidated under external pressure. Even discussions surrounding direct confrontation or leadership targeting were framed less in terms of regime collapse and more around questions of endurance, sacrifice and nationalist consolidation. At the same time, there was visible concern regarding the extent to which Washington’s regional posture is becoming increasingly intertwined with Israeli strategic priorities, further complicating already fragile regional dynamics.

The discussions also reflected growing uncertainty surrounding regional alliances themselves. Several participants suggested that the current environment has accelerated a search for new balancing mechanisms within the Middle East, with countries such as Türkiye and Egypt increasingly viewed as potential stabilising actors amid regional fragmentation. Alongside the geopolitical dimension, there was also considerable emphasis on the economic risks associated with prolonged escalation, particularly concerning the Strait of Hormuz, energy markets and global supply chains.

Syria remained central to many of these concerns. Rather than being viewed as a “resolved” conflict, Syria was repeatedly described as a persistently fragile and fragmented space capable of generating future waves of instability, extremism and transnational insecurity. Discussions surrounding Syria and Iraq also frequently intersected with broader debates regarding Kurdish dynamics, non-state armed actors and the long-term security calculations shaping Turkish foreign policy.

Connectivity, Identity and Türkiye’s Strategic Position

One of the broader impressions emerging from the conference was that Turkish foreign policy is increasingly being shaped by overlapping and chronic crises rather than isolated geopolitical events. Many of the tensions discussed — from Ukraine and the Middle East to energy security and migration — were framed as interconnected crises that repeatedly re-emerge due to the absence of durable political solutions and sustained international engagement.

Within this context, debates surrounding identity and belonging also stood out. A recurring frustration visible throughout several discussions concerned the contradiction of Türkiye being expected to contribute to European and transatlantic security while simultaneously having its “European identity” continuously questioned. This ambiguity was seen as one of the factors complicating long-term strategic trust between Ankara and its Western partners.

At the same time, some of the most forward-looking conversations centred on connectivity. Türkiye’s ambition to connect the Black Sea, the Caspian basin, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East through infrastructure, transport corridors and energy networks was increasingly presented not simply as an economic strategy, but as a geopolitical vision for a more fragmented international order. Importantly, these discussions also suggested that connectivity carries a political and strategic dimension: the creation of new regional alignments capable of reshaping influence across multiple theatres simultaneously.

Ultimately, this discussion reinforced the impression that Türkiye increasingly sees itself not merely as a peripheral actor reacting to crises, but as a state attempting to navigate — and potentially shape — an emerging era of geopolitical fragmentation. In a more transactional and unstable international environment, leadership diplomacy, strategic flexibility and regional manoeuvrability were repeatedly identified as areas where Ankara may hold comparative advantages over more rigid actors within the international system.

Connectivity and Cyprus

Interestingly, the discussions surrounding connectivity have acquired an additional layer almost immediately after the conference concluded. The announcement by Vice President of Türkiye, Cevdet Yılmaz and the TRNC Prime Minister Ünal Üstel of plans regarding the transferring of natural gas from Türkiye to Cyprus inevitably attract attention within this broader context.

Whether these plans should be interpreted merely as an energy initiative, or as part of a wider Turkish strategic vision aimed at connecting the Eastern Mediterranean more tightly to Anatolia, the Black Sea and broader European networks, remains uncertain. Yet after an expert exchange heavily shaped by debates on corridors, interdependence and geopolitical connectivity, it is difficult not to view them as part of a larger conversation about Türkiye’s evolving role within the European security architecture and the growing strategic significance of regional integration.

Against this backdrop, a recurring theme throughout the conference’s reflections on European security architecture was that sustainable regional integration, energy cooperation and long-term stability remain closely bound to the unresolved Cyprus issue. While this is not at all a new argument, it was nonetheless refreshing to see it occupy a more prominent place in the discussions, particularly in relation to the wider strategic questions shaping the region.